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INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY IN PUBLIC, PRIVATE,
AND CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS
BRUCE C. HAFEN*
INTRODUCTION
I applaud the interest of the Thomas J. White Center on
Law and Government in the contemporary problems that
arise under the heading, "Schools and Society." I consider
the use of the word "schools" to be an important choice, ask-
ing for a more precise focus than the word "education"
would suggest. As Eva Brann has said, "A school is not the
world. And yet it is a world, a small republic of the intellect
within the political community."' This thought reminds us
that public and private schools at all levels in our multi-tiered
system of American education are institutional entities in
their own right. Each school has its own history and tradi-
tion, its own distinctive educational mission, its own system of
governance, and its own legal identity and institutional
integrity.
The maintenance of strong forms of institutional identity
and autonomy can be crucial in fulfilling in the lives of indi-
vidual students the educational objectives for which the
schools were established. However, we now live in a day
when institutional authority of all kinds has become increas-
ingly suspect. As part of this large scale trend - as well as
for reasons peculiar to the unique environment of education
- the autonomy of the schools, whether public or private,
has eroded substantially in recent years. As a result, our
schools are in the midst of an identity crisis that I believe ad-
versely affects their capacity to educate their students. At the
same time, some recent Supreme Court decisions appear to
hint toward a restoration of institutional strength, thus call-
ing attention to a potential counter-trend that should be both
noted and encouraged.
After reviewing some background thoughts on the insti-
tutional heritage of schools, I will note two concepts that
have tended to undermine their institutional influence: the
* Dean and Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School.
1. E. BRANN, PARADOXES OF EDUCATION IN A REPUBLIC 146 (1979) (em-
phasis added).
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tendency to view first amendment rights in individual rather
than institutional terms, and the tendency to use federal reg-
ulatory power to control educational policy decisions - espe-
cially in the private sector. In dealing with the first of these
influences I will summarize some recent cases that could help
to slow these trends.
I. THE SCHOOL AS A MEDIATING INSTITUTION
In order to place the institutional position of schools into
a proper conceptual context, I wish first to discuss the con-
cept of mediating institutions.' These are the intermediate or-
ganizations and associations that stand between the individual
and the state. They are typically small, private entities such as
the family, neighborhoods, churches, and other voluntary as-
sociations that contribute toward the realization of "meaning,
fulfillment, and personal identity" for the individual.' The
public sphere, by contrast, is dominated by the "megastruc-
tures" of our mass national markets and by large governmen-
tal bureaucracies. The megastructures have enormous social
and economic influence, but they do not typically seek to tell
us the meaning of our individual lives.
Indeed, democratic theory discourages the governmental
megastructures from imposing monolithic orders of meaning
on individual citizens. Such overpowering intrusions into per-
sonal self-determination are more typical of totalitarian
states. As noted by Robert Nisbet, this characteristic of totali-
tarianism makes it the "ultimate invasion of human privacy."
Significantly, this invasion by which totalitarian regimes es-
tablish a comprehensive sense of personal meaning for indi-
viduals is not possible until "the social contexts of privacy -
family, church, association - have been atomized. The polit-
ical enslavement of man requires the emancipation of man from
all the [intermediate] authorities and memberships . . . that
serve . . . to insulate the individual from external political
power.""
2. For some development of this theme, see Hafen, Developing Student
Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating Struc-
tures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1987). The family as a mediating institution is
discussed in Hafen, Law, Custom, and Mediating Structures: The Family as a
Community of Memory, THE ROCKFORD INSTITUTE CENTER ON RELIGION & SO-
CIETY (publication forthcoming).
3. See P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1977).
4. R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 202 (1953).
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I note in passing that the pressure seen in our own coun-
try in recent years to emancipate individuals from the influ-
ence of mediating institutions has often been motivated by a
commitment to personal autonomy - which appears on its
face to be the opposite of a commitment to increases in state
power. For instance, Laurence Tribe contends in the name of
individual autonomy that future legal developments will lead
to a liberation by the state of "the child - and the adult -
from the shackles of such intermediate groups as [the] fam-
ily." 5 Whatever the ostensible motivation for attacks upon
the institutional authority of intermediate groups, however,
Robert Nisbet argues persuasively that reduced authority
among mediating structures creates precisely the kind of
"spiritual and cultural vacuum" that "the totalitarian must
have for the realization of his design."' This is because "[t]he
shrewd totalitarian mentality knows well the powers of inti-
mate kinship and religious devotion for keeping alive in a
population values and incentives which might well, in the fu-
ture, serve as the basis of resistance" against the totalitarian
state.7
The American system of public education was originally
established as an extension of the private, mediating sphere.8
Such concepts as local control, funding by local taxation, and
in loco parentis correctly identified the important delegation
of parental power that was inherent in the process of educa-
tion in neighborhood public schools. Responding to this dele-
gation, the schools have long been committed, along with
their commitment to traditional academic subjects, to the
teaching of such fundamental civic and moral skills as self-
discipline, honesty, cooperation, self-reliance, and responsibil-
ity. Such instruction has involved public schools in the core
mediating role of value transmission, although not to the
same complete extent as has been typical of private schools.
In more recent years, however, the place of the public
school in our political and social structure has become less
clear. Especially since the school desegregation movement,
schools have been increasingly cast in the role of state agents,
which has moved them away from a mediating role and to-
ward the state megastructure. 9 From the perspective of law
5. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 988 (1978).
6. Nisbet, supra note 4 at 203.
7. Id.
8. See Hafen, supra note 2, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. at 699.
9. For a summary of such historical trends, see Hafen, supra note 2 at
670-95.
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and federal policy, the schools are now indeed part of the
governmentally-sponsored megastructure. Yet many parents
and others still assume the schools should play a value trans-
mission role more typical of a mediating institution. The real-
ity is that public schools are now cast in both roles, with some
segments of the public expecting them to be value neutral
while other segments expect them to take strong value-ori-
ented positions. This structural ambiguity has become a
source of tension and ambivalence in the minds of teachers
and administrators as well as in the public's perception.
This uncertainty about the place of public schools in our
political structures has created confusion about the nature,
role, and authority of the schools. In addition, the institu-
tional authority of the schools has been diminished by a vari-
ety of historical influences that accelerated during the revolu-
tionary era of the 1960s. As documented by educational
historian Diane Ravitch, the student revolts on college cam-
puses blended with a variety of anti-authoritarian protest
movements that had the cumulative effect of altering the hi-
erarchical patterns of organization and instruction in public
schools as well as in higher education.10 The empirical studies
of Gerald Grant and David Riesman also found that the most
widespread and significant impact of this period of educa-
tional upheaval was expanded student autonomy, which led
to broad reductions in traditional academic and behavioral
expectations on college campuses as well as in public
schools." James Coleman and his colleagues corroborated
these findings with their studies comparing private and public
high schools, which documented - among other factors -
the connections between reduced authority in the public
schools and reduced levels of academic performance by pub-
lic school students on standardized tests. 2
The Coleman studies also demonstrated that private
10. See generally D. RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDU-
CATION 1945-80 (1983).
11. G. GRANT AND D. RIESMAN, THE PERPETUAL DREAM: REFORM AND
EXPERIMENT IN THE AMERICAN COLLEGE 188-89 (1978).
12. J. COLEMAN, T. HOFFER, & S. KILGORE, HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT:
PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982). See also the
brief summary of this research in Coleman, Private Schools, Public Schools,
and the Public Interest, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Summer, 1981), at 19, which
addresses the linkage between public school students' academic perform-
ance and public school policies relating to homework, attendance, and
discipline.
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schools generally had higher expectations of their students in
such areas as the academic content of the curriculum,
howework assignments, attendance requirements, and disci-
plinary patterns. Coleman found that these relatively de-
manding educational policies in private schools were directly
correlated with higher student scores on national achieve-
ment tests, even though the family background characteris-
tics of students in private schools also influenced the higher
test scores. This evidence suggests that the institutional au-
thority of private schools was less damaged by the revolution-
ary stirrings of the past generation.
At the same time, however, the institutional energy and
influence of private education at all levels have suffered from
immense financial pressure. Tuitions can only rise so high,
and then they are out of reach for those who desire a private
education. Generally restrictive (even if frequently inconsis-
tent) interpretations of the establishment clause have also
complicated the ability of church-related schools to obtain
state or federal financial assistance. 3 Student financial aid
programs have alleviated some of this pressure, especially
among church-related colleges and universities. Yet, as I will
discuss shortly, student aid is available only when accompa-
nied by enforced conformity to federal policies that can
threaten the unique educational mission of a private school.
Because private schools play a more complete and active me-
diating role with their students than do public schools, the
pressure to conform to federal standards constitutes a partic-
ularly potent threat to the very reasons a private school may
exist.
Against this background sketch of some influences that
have undermined the institutional autonomy of both public
and private schools, I wish to focus on two particular legal
concepts that have contributed to declining authority pat-
terns. Both of these concepts interact with the other large
scale forces I have mentioned, making it difficult to identify
cause and effect relationships. If the constitutional status of
institutional autonomy could be clarified with respect to con-
cepts such as these, however, the ability of schools to resist
other sources of erosion would be strengthened.
13. E.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985);
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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II. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first constitutional problem, which has an impact on
both public and private schools, is that the first amendment
has often been thought to protect individual rights more than
it protects institutional rights, in both free expression and re-
ligion cases. Schools are part of a special cluster of entities
whose institutional interests should be protected by the prin-
ciples of the first amendment. These institutions include
newspapers, schools, universities, churches, and other associa-
tions concerned with the development of intellectual and
spiritual concerns. For many purposes, the family could be
included within this group. These are the carriers of mean-
ing, the institutions Alexis de Tocqueville called "the intel-
lectual and moral associations of America," which he distin-
guished from the "political and industrial associations. '"14
They are devoted to such meaning-related values - both for
individuals and the society - as free inquiry, public dialogue,
artistic expression, intellectual discourse, personal religious
discovery, and the building of associations that foster per-
sonal development as well as mediation between the individ-
ual and the megastructures.
These values have long enjoyed unusually protected sta-
tus within the protections of the first amendment, but the na-
ture of the protection varies in important ways when it is ap-
plied to individual but not to institutional interests. Consider
an illustrative anecdote related to freedom of the press. I
spoke recently with a friend who publishes a daily regional
newspaper. He said the newspaper business is not as satisfying
as it once was for him, in part because of the constant diffi-
culty he experiences with young journalists who are deeply
committed to what he called "advocacy journalism." This at-
titude represents a commitment not only to investigative re-
porting, but to the idea that news reporting should promote
causes the reporter believes in. My publisher friend said his
cub reporters view the first amendment as a personal protec-
tion, not only against governmental censorship, but against
the contrary judgments of their publisher. He considers their
views to be in error, because he pays the bills and is held re-
sponsible for the content of the paper. Yet I think the report-
ers' attitudes typically reflect contemporary assumptions.
Administrators and journalism faculty in the schools and
14. 2 de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114 (Bradley
ed. 1945).
[Vol. 3
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
colleges that finance campus newspapers have probably had
feelings similar to those of this publisher when they have
been required by some courts to print stories prepared by
student writers and editors with whose judgments they disa-
gree. In Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District,"5 for example,
the Eighth Circuit recently held that the first amendment
rights of students were violated when a school administrator
refused to publish sensitive stories written by students for an
official high school paper. The Supreme Court has just re-
versed this case, which suggests that when public school stu-
dents are concerned, the students' most fundamental first
amendment interests just might be advanced by reinforcing a
school's institutional ability to exercise education judgments
in such extra-curricular activities as student newspapers. 6
The Court had already determined in 1986 that the institu-
tional role of a high school justifies the regulation of a vulgar
speech in a student body election assembly.17
Some defenders of free expression concepts assume that
schools should not supervise student expression, because aca-
demic freedom, like freedom of speech, is an individual, not
an institutional, right. This assumption is probably influenced
by the historical development of academic freedom as a
source of protection for individual faculty expression in
American universities. The older heritage of the concept of
academic freedom, however, can be traced to the nineteenth
century German universities, where the faculty's teaching
freedom was strongly linked with the university's institutional
right to manage its own academic affairs. This pattern was
clearly influenced by the tradition that the faculty elected its
own academic officers, but institutional autonomy from state
interference was still the result."8
The U.S. Supreme Court has in a few recent cases intro-
duced the idea of institutional academic freedom for American
schools. One of the earliest descriptions of the concept of ac-
ademic freedom as a first amendment interest was contained
in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire.9 The case involved an individual faculty member,
as did virtually all of the early academic freedom cases; how-
15. 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd 108 S.Ct. 562 (1988).
16. This argument is developed in Hafen, supra note 2, 48 Ohio St.
L.J. 663 (1987).
17. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986).
18. See Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEXAs L. REV.
817, 822-23 (1983).
19. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
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ever, Justice Frankfurter also described academic freedom in
institutional terms as the four essential freedoms of a univer-
sity: who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study. The Supreme
Court relied on this language in the more recent Bakke case,
which upheld a limited first.amendment right for a university
to establish admissions preferences for minority students, de-
spite a contrary equal protection claim by a white student
who was excluded by the university's admissions policy. And
in a unanimous 1985 opinion authored by Justice Stevens,
the Court upheld a university's dismissal of a student for aca-
demic reasons, with the Court relying explicitly on the first
amendment "academic freedom" of "state and local educa-
tional institutions" as a premise for its reasoning. 1 Justice
Stevens stated that "academic freedom thrives not only on
the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among
teachers and students.. . . but also, and somewhat inconsis-
tently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy
itself." 2
The facts of this most recent case may limit institutional
academic freedom to decisions involving subjective academic
judgments; however, Justice Stevens has elsewhere endorsed
the institutional freedom of schools and colleges to control
the use of school facilities and extracurricular programming
decisions. 8 In addition, the concept of institutional academic
freedom does contribute toward the ultimate purposes of the
first amendment by strengthening a school's ability to teach
its students. Freedom of expression has two meanings: free-
dom from restraints and freedom for expression - develop-
ing the capacity for self-expression. A major purpose of edu-
cation is the development of expressive powers in the second
sense, an educational process that requires more than the
mere removal of restraints. As schools exercise judgments
about educational policy, for individual students or for an en-
tire curriculum, they affirmatively nurture first amendment
values.
The institutional autonomy of church-related schools
and colleges is also influenced by prevailing interpretations of
20. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
312 (1978).
21. Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 514
(1985).
22. Id. at 514 n.12.
23. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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the first amendment's religion clauses. In the religion con-
text, as in the free expression context, it has been common to
emphasize individual rather than institutional interests. In
part this attitude is the result of historical developments.
Robert Nisbet has noted, for example, that the ascendance of
Protestant thought in the development of Western civiliza-
tion shifted the focus in religion from the visible to the invisi-
ble Church: "[T]he individual man of faith replaced the cor-
porate Church as the repository of divine guidance." '24 Yet,
wrote Nisbet, the communitarian and institutional sources of
religion are crucial, because experience shows that unsup-
ported individual faith dissolves under the acids of material-
ism and political power.
Mark Tushnet has similarly observed that the dominant
influence of Protestantism in American history gives an indi-
vidualistic flavor to assumptions about the meaning of "reli-
gion" in the religion clauses. Protestant theology emphasizes
the individual's relationship with God, while in the Catholic,
Mormon, and Jewish traditions, for example, the institutional
church or communal forces play a larger role. Tushnet be-
lieves this anti-institutional tendency is reinforced by the as-
sumption of the Western liberal tradition that the free mar-
ket economy is most likely to flourish when personal
economic decisions are made according to self-interest and
without interference from such intermediate institutions as
churches. In contrast to the liberal tradition, the republican
tradition's reliance on representative mechanisms would have
allowed more shaping of individual lives by larger orders and
would implicitly be more likely to understand the legitimacy
of institutional religion.25
Also in this area, however, the Supreme Court has re-
cently emphasized the institutional dimension of religious lib-
erty. Just last term the Court unanimously upheld against an
establishment clause challenge the constitutionality of a fed-
eral statute that permits religious organizations to discrimi-
nate on the basis of religion in favor of their own members in
good standing when making employment decisions in non-
profit activities.2 6 The Court recognized that only religious
activities should be entitled to an exemption from certain
24. Nisbet, supra note 4, at 243.
25. Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701, 729-
738 (1986).
26. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
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anti-discrimination laws, but overturned the lower court's at-
tempt to construct a test that would allow judges to decide
which activities are religious. The Court preferred to base
the justification for an exemption on the objective question
of whether the organization's activity is non-profit rather
than profit. Recognizing the need to limit governmental in-
terference with "the ability of religious organizations to de-
fine and carry out their religious missions," the Court was
concerned about the chilling effect of requiring a religious
organization "on pain of substantial liability, to predict which
of its activities a secular court will consider religious.""'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan recognized
that "religious organizations have an interest in autonomy in
ordering their internal affairs," in part because a religious
community is "an organic entity not reducible to a mere ag-
gregation of individuals." Thus, determining the nature and
leadership of its own activities is "a means by which a reli-
gious community defines itself." Then Justice Brennan added
this significant insight about the relationship between institu-
tional and individual first amendment freedoms: "Solicitude
for a church's ability to [engage in its own self-definition] re-
flects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious
organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as
well." 8
These emerging doctrines of institutional academic and
religious freedom may help clarify the role of both public
and private schools in determining the nature and content of
their educational missions when challenged by claims of indi-
vidual constitutional rights. Lest this point mistakenly be
viewed as unsympathetic to individual liberties, I stress, build-
ing on Justice Brennan's observation, that the institutional
strength of educational and religious institutions is a crucial
source for nurturing affirmatively in individual lives the val-
ues that underlie the first amendment. Most churches, many
private schools, and to an important extent even the public
schools exist as mediating institutions among whose primary
purposes is to encourage over the long term individual
growth, development, and expression. 9 If, by contrast, we
see schools through anti-institutional lenses as arms of the
censoring governmental megastructure, presumed to be the
enemy of open expression, we cast doubt on the core teach-
27. Id. at 2868.
28. Id. at 2871-72 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
29. See Hafen, supra note 2, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. at 695-712.
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ing role of the schools and undermine the fundamental first
amendment right of students to receive an education.
III. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION
A second threat to the institutional autonomy of schools
is the indiscriminate and excessive government regulation of
educational policy. A complete treatment of this topic is be-
yond the scope of this essay,"0 but recent legislation offers an
example of such excessive regulation which deserves our at-
tention - in part because of its novel applications to private,
church-related colleges, and in part because the legislation
has received relatively little opposition.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohib-
its sex discrimination in any educational "program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."31 Other statutes simi-
larly forbid discrimination on the basis of race, handicap, and
age in programs or activities that receive federal aid. In
1984, the Supreme Court interpreted Title IX as it applied
to private, church-related Grove City College in Pennsylva-
nia."2 This college had never received federal financial assis-
tance, but some of its students had personally received fed-
eral educational grants. The school did not discriminate on
the basis of race, sex, or other impermissible criteria in any
of its programs, but its administration refused to sign a tech-
nical statement of compliance on the grounds that doing so
relinquished its institutional autonomy.
The Court construed Title IX to mean that student aid
may be regarded as aid to the institution for the purpose of
establishing federal jurisdiction under the constitutional
spending power. The Court held that such jurisdiction was
limited, however, to the specific educational program or ac-
tivity that actually received federal funds. In the case of
Grove City College, this meant that only the student financial
aid office was subject to Title IX.
Shortly after this decision was announced, a new "Grove
City" civil rights bill was introduced in Congress for the pur-
30. For some references, see generally, Bok, The Federal Government
and the University, 58 PUB. INTEREST 80 (1980); Oaks, A Private University
Looks at Government Regulation, 4 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1976); O'Neil, God and Gov-
ernment at Yale: The Limits of Federal Regulation of Higher Education, 44 U.
CIN. L. REv. 525 (1975).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
32. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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pose of broadening the language of Title IX and similar stat-
utes so that any indirect federal aid would trigger jurisdiction
across the complete campus of a school (or, for that matter,
any other public or private entity) receiving federal funds."3
The language of that proposal has since been slightly modi-
fied in the form of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987."* The effect of this legislation is particularly discourag-
ing to the private colleges and universities that - often at
great sacrifice, compared to their sister institutions - have
refused direct federal assistance for many years in order to
ensure their right of institutional autonomy enough to define
their distinctive educational missions. Under the new legisla-
tion, a private college with one student enrolled who is on
the GI Bill or receiving a Pell grant will be subject to campus-
wide federal jurisdiction on the same terms and to the same
extent as schools whose buildings and programs have re-
ceived major federal subsidies for many years.
One other feature of the new act deserves mention be-
cause it relates directly to our earlier discussion about institu-
tional autonomy on religious as well as educational grounds.
Title IX, as originally enacted, exempts from its operative
definitions schools that are "controlled" by a religious organ-
ization when the application of Title IX would conflict with
the religious tenets of such organizations.33 Schools, however,
that have a religious mission but are not controlled by
churches are not exempt.
Thus, because Grove City College is not actually con-
trolled by a Church, despite its strong Christian affiliation
and educational mission, its religious interests must be subor-
dinated to the commands of Title IX regulations when the
two are in conflict. (This assumes, of course, that at least one
student is receiving a federal grant, thereby creating federal
jurisdiction under Title IX.) For example, the school could
not exclude students involved in extramarital sex," nor could
it freely pursue other personal value preferences based on a
religiously-grounded view of traditional family life, such as
counseling students about conflicts between marriage and ca-
33. See The Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearing on S. 2568 Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-110 (1984)
(statement of Bruce Hafen, President, American Association of Presidents
of Independent Colleges and Universities).
34. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat.
28 (1988). The Act was passed to reverse the Grove City decision.
35. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.12(b) (1987).
36. Id. at §§ 106.21(c), 106.40 and 106.57 (1987).
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reer choices in ways that affirm role distinctions in family life
based on gender.3 7 The college's right not to encourage
abortion, such as by not including abortions within its student
health insurance, has been preserved by an abortion provi-
sion in the 1988 act."
These amendments to Title IX are designed to reach as
far as possible in eradicating sex discrimination. I can under-
stand this objective, because I have seen the harmful effects
in education and elsewhere of gender-based policies and ste-
reotypes. For that reason, my concerns about the amend-
ments relate not to their particular objectives in cases where
harmful discrimination actually exists, but to the way it illus-
trates a contemporary tendency to discount competing consti-
tutional values in seeking a solution to complicated social
problems. Just as an emphasis on individual rights in constitu-
tional theory can obscure the significant contributions to in-
dividual liberty made by relatively autonomous intermediate
institutions, so too an exclusive and single-minded emphasis
on one area of social policy as it applies to educational envi-
ronments can discount competing educational policies that
are important to maintaining diversity, student choice, and
other first amendment values in our total educational system.
I will illustrate by identifying two concerns that draw on the
foregoing background regarding the Grove City legislation.
First, the legislation extends federal authority from insti-
tutions or activities that are directly benefited by government
funding to those that are indirectly benefited. This occurs by
expanding from program-specific coverage of the type the Su-
preme Court recognized in its 1984 case to campus-wide cov-
erage, regardless of the purpose, amount, or organizational
location of the funds. Thus, if the chemistry department re-
ceives a federal research grant, the school's bookstore and
athletic department are also covered by Title IX. This indi-
rect benefit theory was also the basis for the refusal by the
bill's proponents to include an amendment that would have
37. Id. at § 106.36(b) (1987).
38. The abortion provision in the Act declares:
NEUTRALITY WITH RESPECT TO ABORTION
Nothing in this title shall be construed to require or prohibit
any person, or public or private entity, to provide or pay for any
benefit or service including the use of facilities, related to an abor-
tion. Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a penalty
to be imposed on any person or individual because such person or
individual is seeking or has received any benefit or service related
to a legal abortion.
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excluded certain forms of student aid from the definition of
institutional assistance.
Legislative and judicial policymaking has traditionally
been sensitive to the need for maintaining some theory of
limits on the reach of federal regulatory power, especially
where institutions involved in the protection of first amend-
ment values are involved.39 For example, "indirect" educa-
tional assistance in the form of benefits to students or their
families has long been distinguished from "direct" payments
or benefits to schools in the context of Supreme Court cases
dealing with aid to parochial schools. The distinction has
often been a crucial one: only indirect benefits can now with-
stand establishment clause challenges.40
Federal Pell Grants to college students illustrate the con-
ceptual difficulty of regulations based on indirect aid. Many
student-oriented funding programs are administered through
campus-based programs that involve financial management
and discretionary judgments by college officials. However,
college officials have no discretion with respect to the man-
agement or use of Pell Grant funds. A college may adminis-
tratively assist its students in applying for the grants and may
be a conduit for ensuring that student checks reach the ap-
propriate student recipients; but students apply for and re-
ceive such grants upon satisfaction of personal criteria estab-
lished and controlled by the Department of Education. The
student is, after all, the intended primary beneficiary of the
grant program. Because Pell Grant funds are designed to en-
able a student to attend college, the student may use the
funds to pay for a variety of educational-related expenses,
from food and lodging to tuition. Costs other than tuition are
often high enough in relation to grant amounts to consume
all of a student's federal funds. When a grant-receiving stu-
dent pays her tuition, she may thus be using her own or other
non-federal funds. The college she attends obviously benefits
from her attendance, of course, but this indirect benefit is no
different from the benefit received by other private busi-
nesses in her college town. Indeed, if she pays her rent or
auto repair bill - but not her tuition - with her Pell Grant,
39. Most attempts to authorize federal aid to education during the
twenty years after 1945 were unsuccessful because of widespread fears in
Congress and elsewhere that, among other risks, federal assistance would
lead to federal controls that would undermine local authority over educa-
tion. See D. RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-
1980 (1983).
40. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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those recipients may obtain a more "direct" benefit than her
college. Yet the college is regarded as a "recipient" of fed-
eral assistance and the landlord or repair shop apparently is
not.
My point is not simply the unfairness of regulating some
indirect beneficiaries while excluding others; rather, the
move from direct to indirect benefits as a source of jurisdic-
tion may upset longstanding theories about the basis for limi-
tations on federal power, introducing a slippery slope that
will defy meaningful distinctions. Congress may obviously
condition grants of financial assistance on the willingness of a
recipient to comply with federal requirements or policies,
simply because governmental funds should not be expended
in ways that run counter to legitimate government objectives.
The Supreme Court has thus interpreted the spending power
broadly, so long as the conditions accepted by the recipients
are reasonable and unambiguous 4' and "narrowly tailored"
to the achievement of the legislative goal."" But indirect ben-
efits involve broad tailoring as well as broad ambiguities, in
part because all private-sector entities are benefited indirectly
by tax exemptions and other elements of federal taxation or
expenditure policies. It is difficult to imagine where meaning-
ful lines distinguishing the private sector from the public sec-
tor can be drawn amid such breadth and complexity.
Second, the legislation seems insensitive to the potential
impact of broad federal sex discrimination policies on reli-
gious educational institutions. Some advocates of gender neu-
trality argue that the elimination of actual sex discrimination
is an insufficient goal of federal civil rights policy. Rather,
they stress the need to eradicate all social or institutional atti-
tudes in both the public and private sectors that reinforce fe-
male-male distinctions of any kind, including attitudes that
originate in family life, ethnic groups, religious associations,
or social traditions that reinforce any form of sex role as-
sumptions. Churches or church-related colleges that en-
courage hierarchical and patriarchal traditions would obvi-
ously be obstacles in this path. Only by reaching into these
private sources of attitude, some believe, will the ultimate
sources of discrimination be reached and controlled. I note,
parenthetically, that the Equal Rights Amendment would not
reach as far as the 1988 civil rights legislation in establishing
41. South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2796 (1987); Grove City
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984).
42. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980).
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gender-neutral values, because the ERA would apply only to
state - not private - action.
Given the broad goal of addressing privately developed
beliefs, the pervasiveness of federal spending makes the
spending power an attractive vehicle to extend federal regu-
latory authority into the realms where those beliefs may have
their roots. By this means, mediating institutions can be sub-
jected to pressures that characterize them as part of the gov-
ernmental megastructure, thus reducing their capacity to be
carriers of meaning in the development of personal value ori-
entation. The idea of transforming private, church-related
colleges into a quasi-public institution in this way seems espe-
cially ironic, because it tends to impose the tangled contem-
porary arguments about separating church and state on the
campus of a church-related college. The very existence of such
schools has been historically justified on the grounds that
they offered individual students a private, clearly religious al-
ternative to the megastructure.
In another sense, the policy goals of gender neutrality
advocates seek to convert the state-controlled and value-neu-
tral megastructure into a vast, value-oriented institution more
typical of the private tradition, choosing certain personal val-
ues and sources of meaning to the exclusion of others. That
exclusion may not be healthy for the development of long
range social and legislative policy. Consider, for example, a
legitimate value framework that competes with gender neu-
trality for public support. American society has experienced
in recent years a steady erosion of social and legal support for
the concept of stable, formal marriage, which has contributed
directly and indirectly toward increasingly unstable family
structures. The most serious harm caused by this instability is
inflicted on children, whose developmental needs for con-
tinuity and stability are well documented. A plausible case
can be made that a serious public policy reorientation is
needed to restore support for stable marriage and kinship
patterns in all legal, economic, and social environments. This
case could identify instances in which cultural attitudes are
subtly changing in both institutional and social contexts, with
the effect of undermining attitudes and patterns essential to
long term social stability.
It is not difficult to imagine that the goals, and perhaps
the means, of such a campaign might conflict with those of
the campaign for gender neutrality. Yet society's interest in
upholding stable patterns of marriage and kinship is not a
trivial concern. Of course serious differences in perception
[Vol. 3
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
exist regarding the actual relationship between family stabil-
ity and sex role differentiation. But the very existence of
strong, unresolved differences on matters of such profound
social consequence is enough to warrant a cautious approach.
In addition to these implications for social policy, ideas
about sex roles and family life are central to the religious be-
liefs of many people and many private institutions. Many
church-related colleges and universities, freely chosen as pri-
vate institutions by the students who attend them, have tradi-
tionally regarded attitudes about marriage, children, family
life, and related value questions as central to the concerns of
their students. Thus these schools have, as matters of both
educational and religious philosophy, significantly augmented
their students' own family and religious life in the process of
value formation and value transmission.
There are also important differences between sex and
race as legal classifications. It is therefore risky uncritically to
transfer legal doctrines developed in the context of state ac-
tion or in the context of racial problems to the context of
gender. This is especially the case when religious values are
involved, because of the potential impact on matters of per-
sonal morality.
For example, the Fair Housing Act, one of the original
race discrimination laws, was amended a few years ago by ad-
ding "or sex" to the statute. Shortly afterward, a single fe-
male was refused rental accommodations in a student apart-
ment building because of a requirement by a church-related
university that single students living off campus reside in sex-
segregated buildings. After reviewing the woman's com-
plaint, the Justice Department announced its intention to
bring suit. However, when the public media realized that
such enforcement of federal sex discrimination laws appeared
to require single men and women to share apartments and
bedrooms, the roof of public outcry fell in on the Justice De-
partment. An agreement was finally reached which allowed
sex-segregated housing either on or off campus at educa-
tional institutions whose policies are derived from religious
or moral principle. As this illustration suggests, widely sup-
ported religious and moral values can be undermined by the
indiscriminate mixing of race and sex as legal categories.4
43. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1978, § 1 at 33. A N.Y. Times editorial
stated, "As for those people who like to be close to members of the oppo-
site sex, their desire is neither novel nor unnatural. We had not realized
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These examples suggest that private colleges have larger
reasons to pursue autonomy than the desire to cover up some
kind of invidious discrimination. Both the history of Ameri-
can education and our theory of democratic pluralism - es-
pecially at the level of higher education - reflect the value
of a rich variety of educational institutions, many of them re-
flections of the unique vision of their founders.
Such diversity also reflects the value in a democratic soci-
ety of allowing individuals to choose among alternative ap-
proaches. We have had single-sex colleges, religious colleges,
secular colleges, vocational institutes, and pure liberal arts in-
stitutions. Which of these approaches is correct? Historically,
we have not thought it appropriate for the federal govern-
ment to answer that question. Like the economic market-
place, the national marketplace of ideas is well-served by di-
vergent approaches and brisk competition. In addition to
offering the consumer a wide array of choices, the competi-
tors learn from one another and the entire marketplace is im-
proved. And, reflecting the place of mediating institutions,
the variety and institutional integrity of such diverse ap-
proaches is at the heart of the first amendment's interest in
allowing each man or woman to define the meaning and pur-
pose of his or her own life.
CONCLUSION
Mediating institutions have traditionally stood between
individuals and the government megastructure. They have
come under attack in recent years from the individual side
because of their institutional character at a time when all in-
stitutions have seemed suspect. They are also under assault
from the megastructure side, partly because of constitutional
doctrines that favor individual over institutional values, and
partly because financial pressures force their absorption by
governmental megastructures. In addition, the megastructure
may be too willing to respond to pressure from the advocates
who wish to see the megastructure absorb mediating institu-
tions in order to control them.
The argument for broad institutional autonomy may be
stronger when applied to private, church-related schools than
it is when applied to public schools. But schools of both kinds
are entitled to their own forms of first amendment protec-
tion. They need increased institutional strength, not only to
until now that it required the intervention of Washington to be satisfied."
N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1978, § 1 at 26.
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encourage a stronger private educational sector, but to en-
courage greater educational quality throughout the Ameri-
can system of education. Justice Brennan wrote that the "fur-
therance of the autonomy of religious organizations often
furthers individual religious freedom as well."' 4 For the same
reason, enhancing the autonomy of educational institutions
also enhances the educational opportunities of the students
who attend them.
44. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S.Ct. 2862,
2871-72 (Brennan, J., concurring).
19881

